The Check Collection Muddle by Steffen, Roscoe T.
THE CHECK COLLECTION MUDDLE
ROSCOE T. STEFFEN *
Were it not for the fact that checks are already in general
use, in order that transactions might continue to be carried
on with the facility and dispatch which we have come to ex-
pect, some such instrument would have to be invented prompt-
ly. A suggestion that we return to the more cumbersome and
very much more hazardous method of settling accounts with
cash is unthinkable today. Nor is there much likelihood of
such a suggestion being made, for despite its age of well over
two centuries,, the check still presents a satisfyingly modern,
even streamlined, appearance. It has long been fully nego-
tiable,'--more aptly a "courier without luggage" than any
other commercial instrument. But, while the holder has thus
been highly favored as respects prior parties, we have been
amazingly slow to build any comparable legal machinery to
facilitate collections. The fact is that in recent years the
holder has too often lost a large part or all of the proceeds of
his item in the process of collection, a queer state of affairs
indeed.
It is not difficult, however, to see in broad outline how this
situation has come about, whatever may be suggested for
its correction. Of course, the unprecedented plague of bank
failures during the Coolidge and Hoover administrations, cul-
minating in the closing of all banks in March, 1933, accounted
for vast losses., But while this dramatized the situation, it
should not be allowed to obscure the point that important
changes in banking practice as respects collections had al-
ready been taking place. At one time it was customary-
as it still is to some extent-to give credit subject to immedi-
ate drawing upon the deposit of demand paper, more or less
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School; draftsman of the proposed Uni-
form Bank Collection Act. The writer wishes to acknowledge gratefully
the aid and assistance of John M. Prutzman, of the class of 1937, Yale
Law School, in preparing this paper.
"'The earliest printed cheques are those of Childs, and are believed
to date from 1762. Cheque books began to be issued about 1781." Powell,
Evolution of the Money Market (1915) 103. There are examples of
checks, not printed, dating back at least as far as 1684. Id., at p. 101.
2N. I. L. § 185.
3Bank failures for the years 1921 to 1933 are as follows: 1921, 505;
1922, 367; 1923, 646; 1924, 775; 1925, 618; 1926, 976; 1927, 669; 1928,
499; 1929, 659; 1930, 1,352; 1931, 2,294; 1932, 1,456. This represents a
total of 10,816 banks having a total capitalization of $653,245,000 and
involving deposit liabilities amounting to $4,885,126,000. 19th Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Board (1933) 151.
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as though the bank had purchased it. 4 Nor was this practice
unprofitable, for the item in turn could often be used to
build up the bank's reserve account with its correspondent,
immediate credit being again given, and on occasion such
balances bore interest. But much of this practice was swept
away by the inauguration of the Federal Reserve system in
1913, with its requirement that only collected balances should
count as reserves.- The paper reserve system, accompanied
as it was by a practice of circuitous routing to suit the
banker's convenience, neither provided protection for deposi-
tors, nor an efficient collection system for check holders.,
But even before this the banker had had his misgivings of
the immediate credit plan. The banker did not relish the
notion of being obligated to pay drawings against checks
which might never be collected.7  It was an extension of
credit, of a sort, without any corresponding interest charge.8
Nor did he like the notion that, as purchaser, he would be
responsible for collection risks. Of course, when the shoe
was on the other foot and the depositor of the paper had
failed owing money to the banker, he was quite glad to appear
as a holder in due course of the paper; in this case, he was
clear that he had purchased it.9 The result of this dissatis-
faction was a long period of experimentation in which various
clauses were designed to absolve the bank from first one risk,
and then another. It was stipulated that paper was taken for
collection only.10 If credited, it was not subject to drawing
until paid or, since it might be paid but not remitted for, until
4Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper as "Purchases", 37 Yale L. Jour.
874 (1928).
"Act of Dec. 23, 1913, c. 6, § 19, 38 Stat. at L. 270, 12 U. S. C. § 462.
See also Regulation D of the Federal Reserve Board.
"See particularly the discussion of this whole development in Spahr,
The Clearing and Collection of Checks (1926) 84-130.7There are very few cases holding that the bank must pay in such
case, but this does not indicate so much that the point is unsettled as
that banks have avoided, as much as possible, being put in a position to
have to litigate the point. See, Dirnfield v. Fourteenth Street Savings
Bank, 37 App. D. C. 11 (1911).
8See comments of the court adverse to the purchase, or discount, idea
from the business standpoint in Falls City Woolen Mills v. Louisville
National Banking Co., 145 Ky. 64, 140 S. W. 66, 67 (1911). The teller
receiving paper on deposit is not a competent representative of the
bank to purchase commercial paper.
9See, for example, Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd, 90 N. Y.
530, 535 (1882).
lOThe court, in the early case of Taft v. Quinsigamond Nat. Bank,
172 Mass. 363, 52 N. E. 387 (1899), rather went out of its way to sug-
gest to the banker that he should make use of such clauses to define his
position as agent, if that was the result he wanted. Cf. National Bank
of Commerce v. Bossemeyer, 101 Nebr. 96, 162 N. W. 503 (1917).
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proceeds were actually received." And credit might be
charged back at any time, whether the relative item could be
returned or not.12  No responsibility was assumed for cor-
respondents-or for losses in the mail-or otherwise. 13 The
net result was to shift to the check holder all risks, many of
which had once been borne by the banks-or, at least, the
evidence is overwhelming that such was the intent.
Nor did the thing stop here. Many banks further stipu-
lated that they might forward paper by mail directly to the
bank on which drawn-all without responsibility-notwith-
standing the well settled rule of the courts that to do so was
hazardous and constituted negligence. And when in 1924 the
Supreme Court in the Malloy case 4 ruled that notwithstand-
ing such a stipulation the forwarding bank should neverthe-
less be liable for receiving remittance by draft, cash or bullion
being the approved medium, the bankers, or their counsel,
said quite loudly that the decision was "archaic". 15 Not that
it was "horse and buggy" law exactly, but still it did not fit
modern conditions. In fact most of the carefully constructed
law of the courts was too "ancient" to be useful any longer.
Even so, many bankers, being rugged individualists, were
still slow to "regiment" themselves under the protection of
the complete waiver thoughtfully prepared for them by gen-
eral counsel, notwithstanding that it was heralded as being
only one hundred and thirty-four words long.' 6 But when
shortly afterwards Justice Stone decided in the City of
Douglas case 7 that the purchase rule still obtained in the
federal courts-thus making the initial bank liable for col-
lection losses-it was evident that the time had come to go
to the legislature.
"See, for example, the clause set out in Security Savings & Trust Co.
v. Xing, 69 Ore. 228, 138 Pac. 465 (1914).
12The "charge back" clauses gave a great deal of trouble to the courts,
for many were unable to see how such clauses could be reconciled with
the "purchase" notion. See generally Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse
and Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac. 869 (1920).
13These and other clauses are discussed in Note, 27 Col. L. Rev. 73
(1927).
14Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 298, 68
L. Ed. 617 (1924).
1GPaton, Uniform Bank Collections Code, 21 Am. Bankers Ass'n.
Jour. 907 (1929). "No one will question the statement that this deci-
sion is archaic when applied to the present methods of collection." Of
course, this neglects the point that, even so, the banker should bear the
risk if new and more dangerous methods of collection are employed. See
Note, 33 Yale L. Jour. 752 (1924).
161 Paton's Digest (1926) 239, § 1446 ... 2 id., at p. 1462, § 1446a.
17City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 271 U. S. 489, 46 Sup.
Ct. 554, 70 L. Ed. 1051 (1926).
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The matter reached the stage for action in 1928. And,
since bankers were then riding the crest of the wave, it was
decided to call the new act the Uniform Bank Collection Code,
thus trading without permission on the prestige of the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.-8 And, why not? for
the name Uniform is not patented. But it does not appear
from the record either, that the depositor of paper for collec-
tion was ever consulted in the drafting of this legislation.
Perhaps, as the case was both technical and complicated, it
was thought that his interests, if important, could be best
protected by the banker. At all events when the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws themselves undertook to draft
a comprehensive collection act, in 1928, and the draftsman
invited the bankers to co-operate, it was pointed out that the
matter was already being well taken care off.19 Not only did
the bankers give no assistance, but on the contrary, they hur-
ried their own statute all the more. The upshot of the matter
was that the banker's act was quickly drafted as a glorified
form of bank collection waiver, and as promptly adopted by
some nine states in 1929 which were quickly followed by nine
others.20  Since 1931, however, progress in this direction has
ceased.
lalndeed, the matter went even further in some States, as in NeW
York, where the act was adopted as a separate article of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. 37 N. Y. McKinney's Consol. Laws Ann. (Supp.
1933) §§ 350-350(1).
19Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1928) 138. Mr. Beutel's statement that the bankers or their
attorneys had a hand in preparing the Commissioners' act from the
start is entirely without foundation. See Beutel, Bank Collections Act, 9
Tulane L. Rev. 378, 385 (1935).
2Oldaho Ann. Code (1932) §§ 25-1301-25-1317 (effective May 5,
1931); 1II. Callaghan's Ann. Stats. (Supp. 1931) c. 16a, §§ 25-39 (ef-
fective July 8, 1931; title changed and §§ 14, 16, 19 of the original
omitted); Ind. Baldwin's Ann. Stats. (1934) §§ 8043-8060 (effective
July 1, 1929); Ky. Carroll's Stats. (Supp. 1933) §§ 3720b-69a-3720b-
69a-12 (effective June 18, 1930); Md. Bagby's Ann. Code (Supp. 1929)
Art. 11, §§ 83-89 (effective June 1, 1929); Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp.
1933) §§ 12074-1-12074-18 (effective Aug. 27, 1931); Mo. Rev. Stats.
(1929) §§ 5565-5575 (effective Aug. 27, 1929; §§ 11, 12 of the original
omitted); Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929) §§ 62-1801-62-1815 (effective April
30, 1929; § 3 of the original omitted); N. J. Comp. Stats. (Supp. 1930)
§§ 17-18--17-97 (effective May 6, 1929); N. M. Comp. Stats. Ann. (1929)
§§ 13-1301-13-1317 (effective June 7, 1929) ; 37 N. Y. McKinney's Con-
sol. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1933) §§ 350-350(1) (effective April 12, 1929) ;
Ore. Laws of 1931, c. 138, p. 189 (effective June 4, 1931; original act
modified) ; Pa. Purdon's Stats. (Supp. 1935) title 7, §§ 212-228 (ef-
fective Sept. 1, 1931; § 6 of the original modified to include "borough,
incorporated town or township" after the word "city"); 3 S. C. Code
(1932) §§ 6948-6963 (effective March 28, 1930); Wash. Laws of 1929,
c. 203, pp. 49-50 (effective June 12, 1929); W. Va. Acts of 1931, c. 15,
pp. 45-51 (effective June 9, 1931) ; Wis. Stats. (1931) § 220.15 (effective
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No doubt in a well-ordered world, where the race is to the
strong, this discourse should end here. The banker had been
given all he had asked for. But unfortunately he had asked
for a little too much. Possibly to make amends to the check
holder for unceremoniously putting all losses on him, the act
was made to provide further that, upon the insolvency of any
collecting bank with proceeds of an item in hand, such pro-
ceeds should be held in trust.21 By this means it was thought
to salvage, ahead of general depositors in the failed bank, as
much as possible in the interest of the forwarder of collection
paper; and, one may suspect, the banker did not lose sight of
the fact that this would be helpful to the initial bank itself,
in case it owned or had a lien upon the paper in question.
Then, to make the remedy water tight, it was provided that
the customary augmentation of assets requirement should
be waived22 and that no tracing of "trust" proceeds was nec-
essary.23
But even this was not enough, for an insolvency might
occur where there literally were no assets upon which to as-
sert a trust. Accordingly it was further provided that, in
case of the failure of a drawee or payor bank (to which an
Aug. 3, 1929) ; Wyo. Laws of 1931, c. 74, pp. 138-143 (effective May 22,
1931).21The relevant provision of section 13 of the Banker's Code follows:
"When a drawee or payor bank has presented to it for payment an
item or items drawn upon or payable by or at such bank and at the time
has on deposit to the credit of the maker or drawer an amount equal to
such item or items and such drawee or payor shall fail or close for busi-
ness as above, after having charged such item or items to the account of
the maker or drawer thereof or otherwise discharged his liability there-
on but without such item or items having been paid or settled for by
the drawee or payor either in money or by an unconditional credit given
on its books or on the books of any other bank, which has been requested
or accepted so as to constitute such drawee or payor or other bank
debtor therefor, the assets of such drawee or payor shall be impressed
with a trust in favor of the owner or owners of such item or items for
the amount thereof, or for the balance upon a number of items which
have been exchanged, and such owner or owners shall be entitled to a
preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of whether the fund
representing such item or items can be traced and identified as part of
such assets or has been intermingled with or converted into other assets
of such failed bank." A similar provision follows to cover proceeds in
the hands of a failed collecting bank other than the drawee or payor.22Many courts have held for example that where the drawer or maker
pays the item in question by check on the collecting bank that its assets
have not been "augmented" and that accordingly there is nothing on
which to assert a trust. Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan
Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922); Ellerbe v. Studebaker
Corporation of America, 21 F. (2d) 99- (C. C. A. 4th 1927); cf. Mes-
senger v. Carroll Trust & Say. Bank, 193 Iowa 608, 187 N. W. 545 (1922).
See Comment, 36 Yale L. Jour. 682, 685-686 (1927).23For a comprehensive survey of this problem, see Townsend, Tracing
Technique in Bank Preference Cases. 7 U. Cin. L. Rev. 201 (1933).
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item had been sent by mail for payment) before its remit-
tance draft should be collected, the forwarding bank, at its
election, might treat the original item as wholly unpaid.
24
Thus by one way, if not another, losses were to be put on the
depositors of the failed bank. Of course the decisions have
been fairly uniform to the effect that when the drawer's ac-
count is charged and his check cancelled, it is deemed paid
and all parties are discharged. 25 Moreover, once discharged,
their liability may not be so casually revived, and certainly
not at the election of some bank not the real owner of the
paper. Indeed, one may well imagine the pained surprise
with which the maker of a note payable at a bank would hear
the annofincement that the forwarding bank had elected to
hold him liable-notwithstanding the fact that he had paid in
cash already and had taken up the cancelled note. But so the
law was written; according to its terms recourse might even
be had against indorsers in such case, regardless of the long
settled rule to the contrary as codified in the Negotiable In-
strument Law.2 6 If the court's law was "archaic", local de-
positors at least would seem justified in calling that of the
banker "unconscionable".
It is only the "trust" provision, however, which has proved
vulnerable in the courts so far. This is not to say that the
holder's rights on a "revived" instrument are necessarily
24 The relevant part of section 11 of the Bankers Code follows:
"Where an item is duly presented by mail to the drawee or payor,
whether or not the same has been charged to the account of the maker
or drawer thereof or returned to such maker or drawer, the agent
collecting bank so presenting may, at its election, exercised with reason-
able diligence, treat such item as dishonored by nonpayment and re-
course may be had upon prior parties thereto in any of the following
cases:
(1) Where the check or draft of the drawee or payor bank upon
another bank received in payment therefor shall not be paid in due
course; . .."
25This was the rule of Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, supra note 14.
See also Stout Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 25 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 5th 1928);
Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 253 (1929). The opposite re-
sult was reached, however, in Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co. 18 F. (2d)
711 (C. C. A. 4th 1927) (by construction of the anti-par clearance statute,
in force in North Carolina); and in Lake Charles Feed Co. v. Sabatier,
12 La. App. 89, 125 So. 318 (1929) (by recourse to the doctrine that the
giving of a check or draft is only conditional, not absolute payment). Of
course, an insuperable technical difficulty with this last argument is
that, whether paid or not, secondary parties still may be discharged by
the delay.
26It is further provided under § 12 of the Banker's Code that notices
of dishonor to indorsers shall be sufficient if given within a reasonable
time after "such dishonor." Presumably the "dishonor" occurs when' the
collecting bank in its discretion, exercised with reasonable diligence,
elects to treat it as dishonored.
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clear, for the contrary is the case,2r but the banker has had
no cause to complain of the decisions as yet. For that matter,
the trust provision came up early and was fully sanctioned,
28
even in the face of the National Bank Act, which provides
for a pro rata distribution of assets.29  Here was complete
success, for it had been hoped that, by simulating the common
law trust, state legislation alone would suffice. Nor was this
so unreasonable for, after all, who is to say what constitutes
a trust ?30 It did seem, however, that the Illinois court had
gone a little too far when it gave the holder of a certified
check a preferred claim under the statute,3 1 for the provision
was not intended to give everyone a preferred status.
Still, the so-called "trust" provided by the statute was much
too crude a device to stand very close inspection. No effort
whatever had been made to conform it to the increasing
number of decisions which had granted the forwarder a pre-
ferred claim.32 These cases had shown a willingness to dis-
regard the dictum that the ordinary mingling of assets, nec-
essary in usual collection practice, is an indication of a debtor-
creditor relation,83 and moreover many had not insisted upon
27The difficulty has arisen in determining what facts will constitute
an election on the part of the collecting bank. In the case of In re Jayne
& Mason, 140 Misc. 822, 251 N. Y. S. 768 (1931) the Federal Reserve
Bank had charged back the items in question to its customers, but had
not asked for the return of the checks or taken any proceedings as upon
their dishonor. It was ruled that there had been no election to treat
the paper as dishonored and a preferred claim was accordingly allowed.
In Jones v. Board of Education 242 App. Div. 17, 272 N. Y. S. 5 (1934),
the Federal Reserve Bank had been able to regain the original check
and had returned it on charging back the account. This was held to
operate as an election to treat the paper as dishonored and the payee
was permitted to recover from the drawer.28Prudden & Co. Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Secaucus, 115 N. J. Eq.
365, 170 Atl. 860 (1934) ; see National Bank of America v. United States
F. & G. Co., 71 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 7th 1934).
29The controlling federal statute is the Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, §
50, 13 Stat. at L. 114, 12 U. S. C. § 194. Cf. Chicago First Nat. Bank
v. Selden, 120 Fed. 212, 62 L. R. A. 559 (C. C. A. 7th 1903).
3oWhere federal and state court rules conflict, it has been supposed
that either would prevail, depending on the jurisdiction in which suit
was brought. But see Central National Bank v. First National Bank,
115 Neb. 444, 216 N. W. 302 (1927).31McQueen v. Randall, 353 Ill. 231, 187 N. E. 286 (1933). And sim-
ilarly, in People v. Dennhardt, 354 Ill. 450, 188 N. E. 464 (1933), the
holder of a check who had taken a draft in payment was given a pre-
ferred claim. Contra, In re Bank of United States, 243 App. Div. 287,
277 N. Y. S. 96 (1935) ; Ex parte Sanders, 168 S. C. 323, 167 S. E. 154
(1932).
S2For a comprehensive survey, see Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection
Items, and Trust Preferences, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 445, 550 (1931).38 in Cameron v. Carnegie Trust Co., 292 Pa. 114, 140 Atl. 768 (1928),
the court regarded the custom to commingle funds as ineffectual to de-
feat the trust. Cf. Bassett v. Mechanics' Bank of New Haven, 118 Conn.
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strict compliance with the common law tracing require-
ments 14 But the courts in these cases had usually found at
least that the proceeds of the forwarder's item could fairly
be said to have gone into or tended to preserve the liquid
assets of the bank. The Banker's Code on the contrary was
drawn to charge everything in sight; the bank building itself,
although perhaps acquired fifty years before the forwarder's
item was received, could be sold to provide funds to pay the
forwarder's claim in full.35 Evidently nothing but the name
resembled the common law trust and, as had been freely
predicted, 6 when the provision came before the Supreme
Court it was quickly held invalid as applied to national
banks.
3 7
The result was a body blow to the Banker's Code. Of
course it still purported to give the check holder a preferred
claim in case of a state bank insolvency, and it seemed that
the various provisions designed to shift risks from the for-
warding and collecting banker to his customers would still
obtain. The first intimation to the contrary came when the
Wyoming court said that possibly the whole act was invalid 8
But the issue was not raised squarely until late in 1935, in
People v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,39 when the Illinois court
decided that "the Legislature had no intention to create a
situation where the rights of owners of commercial paper
depend upon whether it is payable by or at a state or a
national bank."40 This accounted for the preference provi-
sion; if the "trust" was invalid in the case of failed national
banks, so was it also in the case of state banks. The court
490, 173 Atl. 228 (1934) ; In re International Milling Co., 259 N. Y. 77,
181 N. E. 54 (1932). In the case last cited Hubbs, J., was careful to
point out that the forwarder would have a position even superior to that
of a forwarder under section 13 of the Bankers Code. But here the
forwarder had provided in his indorsement that proceeds should not be
mingled, a purely rhetorical provision.
34Nor is it possible, if worth the effort and expense, to do a very cer-
tain job of tracing. Cf. Lane v. First National Bank of Vale, 131 Ore.
350, 281 Pac. 172 (1929), noted in 39 Yale L. Jour. 576 (1930).
35See supra note 21.
86Bogert, loc. cit. supra note 32, at p. 567; Dunham, The Incidence of
Loss by Non-Clearance of Checks through Bank Failure, 4 Assoc. of Life
Ins. Counsel Proceedings 595, 609 (1930).3 7 01d Company's Lehigh, Inc. v. Meeker, 294 U. S. 227, 55 Sup. Ct.
392, 79 L. Ed. 876 (1935) ; Jennings v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 294 U. S. 216,
55 Sup. Ct. 394, 79 L. Ed. 869 (1935); see Note, 44 Yale L. Jour. 341
(1935).38in re Riverton State Bank, 48 Wyo. 372, 49 P. (2d) 637, 641 (1935).
39362 Ill. 164, 199 N. E. 272 (1935).




then went on to say that, since this provision was designed
to compensate holders for the increased risks thrown upon
them by the act, the whole scheme of the statute would be
affected by its omission. The entire act was accordingly de-
clared void.
If these decisions signalize the final passing of the Banker's
Code, there are those who will not sorrow unduly. 41 Accord-
ing to Beutel, "the code is one of the most 'vicious types of
class legislation present on the statute books in America, in
that it attempts to throw all the risks of the collection proces-
sion upon the depositors . . .,,12 But, at least, the Bankers
Code is "frank in its viciousness", 8 for the plan of the act is
laid bare to anyone who reads. "Except as otherwise pro-
vided by agreement... where an item is deposited or received
for collection, the bank of deposit shall be agent of the de-
positor for its collection and each subsequent collecting bank
shall be sub-agent of the depositor ... and any credit given
by any such agent or sub-agent bank therefore shall be
revocable until such time as the proceeds are received in
actual money or an unconditional credit given on the books
of another bank . . ."" In other words the intent is very
clear to avoid the burdens of the purchase rule as defined in
the City of Douglas case45 and to contract for the immunity
to be had under the Massachusetts collection rule.4 6  The
initial banker is to be a mere "conduit", through which all out
of town paper flows.
But whether this "conduit" notion is "vicious", or merely
good business, some courts have been slow to give the banker
his due. In one of the first cases to come up the depositor
had been allowed to draw against a credit given for out of
41The Code has been severely criticized both from the standpoint of
policy and of draftsmanship. See Donley, Some Problems in the Col-
lection of Checks, 38 W. Va. L. Quar. 195 (1932).42Beutel, Bank Collections Act, 9 Tulane L. Rev. 378, 385 (1935).
... and at the same time preserve for intermediate banks all the
rights of the holders in due course of the paper which they are collect-
ing."
43lbid.
44A. B. A. Code § 2.
4rSupra, note 17.48Under this rule the initial bank assumes no responsibility for cor-
respondents, though it must exercise care in selecting a competent one.
Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330 (Mass. 1839). In contrast, the
New York rule makes the forwarding bank responsible not only for its
correspondent's handling of the collection, but for losses due to the lat-
ter's insolvency. Gilpin v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 220 N. Y. 406, 115 N.
E. 982, L. R. A. 1917F 864 (1917).
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town paper. No stipulation was used by the bank, while the
credit was, in the words of the statute, merely "revocable"
and so would seem not to upset the agency relation.47 The
South Carolina court decided, however, that the statute had
no application to such a case, since the bank must still be
taken to have "purchased" the paper, inasmuch as it allowed
drawings, and accordingly held that it was responsible for
collection losses.48 The result of this case warned the banker
that his law was not alone sufficient; he still needed to make
use of stipulations denying positively that he was in any sense
a "debtor" to the depositor.
A more important test of the "conduit" concept occurred
with insolvency of the bank of deposit, that is, the forwarding
bank. Unfortunately in the first case to come up the bank
had again allowed drawings ($21.78 against an item for
$1973.50). In some measure offsetting this, however, the
bank had stipulated: "All checks credited subject to final
payment." In this setting the Missouri court held" that the
bank, or rather its receiver, could recover upon the paper as
though it were an owner, not an agent, even although it was
recognized that to do so would force the depositor to come in
as a general creditor. But in the court's view:
To hold otherwise would be to give an unfair and
unjustified advantage to the depositor ... In daily
bank transactions, to give the depositor of a check or
draft such an advantage over other depositors is so
far removed from equity and justice as to be repug-
nant to public policy. 0
In the next cases to come up the depositor had not even
asked for "immediate" credit, but had placed his paper with
the bank for "collection and credit". Here, although the bank
had actually received the proceeds--ordinarily enough in it-
self to give rise to a debtor-creditor relation-the depositor
was given a preferred claim, for the reason that no formal
book entry to his credit had been made previous to the insol-
vency.51 And more recently, the same result was reached in
47See supra note 44.
4 8Lawton v. Lower Main St. Bank, 170 S. C. 334, 170 S. E. 469 (1933).4 9Farmers' Exchange Bank v. Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 52
S. W. (2d) 608 (Mo. App. 1932).
5 oSee Farmers' Exchange Bank v. Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n,
52 S. W. (2d) 608, 609-610 (Mo. App. 1932), revd. 332 Mo. 1041, 61 S. W.
(2d) 717 (1933).
5 'Denkichi Tsuji v. Moody, 173 Wash. 376, 23 P.(2d) 403 (1933) ; State
v. Kingston, 215 Wis. 80, 254 N. W. 126 (1934).
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a case where provisional credit had in fact been given, be-
cause an advice of collection had not been received.52 These
courts did not say why such a depositor should have a claim
superior to that of other depositors in the failed bank; it was
enough that such is the purport of the statute.
Whether their reasoning was "vicious" or not, at least the
banker had no complaint to make of these decisions. He did
have some doubts, however, of Dakin v. Bayy,53 decided in
1933 under legislation in some respects like that of the
Banker's Code, for in this case there were intimations that
the "conduit" idea might have its shortcomings. This time
the contest arose as between the bank of deposit and the col-
lecting bank to which it had forwarded customers' paper for
collection. It seems that the latter had failed after having
remitted by draft-the typical situation giving trouble. But
the forwarding bank was indebted to the failed collecting
bank and when sued on this indebtedness it sought to set-off
the amount of the remittance drafts, which it still held. The
defense was denied, for, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts,
the claims were not "mutual". The paper having gone
through the forwarding bank as a mere agent, the bank could
not thereafter use the remittance drafts to pay its own obli-
gations. But, of course, the result did not directly affect the
forwarding banker's pocket, although it did close the door to
one means whereby owners of collection items might recover
in full on their paper.
But the Dakin case was of concern to the collecting banker.
His relation, on the "conduit" theory, to the depositors in the
forwarding bank was too clearly disclosed. In the event that
the forwarding bank should fail, would the collecting bank's
traditional claim upon the depositor's paper, or its proceeds,
be entirely respected? The matter finally came to a head in
Leonardi v. The Chase National Bank of New York. 4 This
was a suit by a Florida depositor in a Miami bank to recover
the proceeds of his New York collection, which the collecting
bank sought to apply upon the forwarding bank's indebted-
ness. It appeared that the collecting bank had collected the
paper, credited the Miami bank with the amount and sent a
5 21n re Harr, 179 AtI. 723 (Pa. 1935). But cf. State v. South Omaha
State Bank, 129 Neb. 43, 260 N. W. 815 (1935). In this case, however,
the credit was subject to drawing.
r290 U. S. 143, 54 Sup. Ct. 113, 78 L. Ed. 229 (1933).
5411 F. Supp. 85 (D. C. N. Y. 1935).
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notice thereof-all before the latter's insolvency became
known. The argument centered on the effect of the credit
entry; did it create a debtor-creditor relation between the two
banks, so that the Florida depositor could thereafter look only
to the Miami bank? The court was quite clear that it did not
and that the depositor could disregard the Miami bank and
recover in full from Chase; surely not a "vicious" result, at
least from the depositor's viewpoint.
The result would seem to be fully consistent with the
"conduit" theory, assuming that that theory was intended to
work both ways. But the fact is that such was not the in-
tention. While the banker has been very zealous to appear
to his customer as a mere conduit, he has always dealt with
the customer's paper as though it were his own.55 Moreover,
the collecting banker to whom he has sent it-as in this
case-always has treated the paper as an asset of the for-
warding bank. Indeed, the Banker's Code itself is very careful
to say that, notwithstanding that the initial bank is an agent,
still all "subsequent holders sliall have the right to rely on
the presumption that the bank of deposit is the owner of the
item."' 6 Thus the way is prepared, verbally at least, for a
rather high-handed disregard of the depositor's interest,
though how a court can permit such a violent presumption to
stand in a world where all paper is taken for collection is
difficult to see. But, even so, when the facts are brought
home to the collecting bank by the depositor, it can only de-
fend by showing either, that it has become a holder in due
course of the paper, or that it has remitted for the item and
no longer holds any proceeds belonging to the depositor. The
court in the Leonardi case decided -that a mere credit entry,
in the circumstances before it, did not constitute such a re-
mittance. And a charge after insolvency, of course, came too
late.
5 5A great many cases could be cited illustrating this point, if neces-
sary. In one of the most flagrant and recent examples, State v. Kingston,
supra note 51, bonds and coupons to the amount of $73,810 were deposited
by the State Treasury Department for collection and credit. These the
bank forwarded to its Chicago correspondent for immediate credit, mak-
ing out and holding in its own records a certificate of deposit evidencing
the transaction. And see Bank of Aurora v. Fruit Growers' Union, 52 S.
W.(2d) 574, 575 (Mo. App. 1932).56A. B. A. Code § 4. This provision was inserted to get around cases
like Schram v. Askegaard, 34 F. (2d) 348, 349 (D. C. Minn. 1929), where
Sanborn, J., said-realistically-that the collecting bank must assume
that the forwarding bank was an agent. This meant that it could not
recover against the forwarding bank's depositor on the latter's indorse-
ment, even though it had given value.
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The court did not discuss the further possibility that the
collecting bank had become a holder in due course of the de-
positor's item. An argument, though not a very good one,
could have been made that by merely giving credit it had
satisfied the value requirements of the N. I. L.11 Of course,
it would have to be recognized that under the Banker's Code
the collecting bank, like the forwarding bank, must be taken
to. have received the paper as agent only, not as purchaser.
And the giving of credit under such circumstances, except as
drawings may have been allowed, could be said to amount to
only a preliminary step in the process of making remittance.
But there was an even more serious obstacle, for the Miami
bank had used a "Pay any bank or banker" indorsement,
which, under the Banker's Code, has been made restrictive. 8
Thus, at best, the collecting bank could have obtained no
better title to the item than the Miami bank had, and since
the latter was a mere "conduit" this would not be helpful at
all. In fact the depositor had used a "for deposit" in-
dorsement, which also is made restrictive under the statute,59
so that the former bank could not even "presume" that the
Miami bank was an owner.8 0 And as for title to the proceeds,
it must not be lost sight of that the collecting bank's rights
to these can rise no higher than its rights to the item itself.
The title question was thus not argued because the statute
had left the collecting bank with nothing to argue.
Thus, far from being "vicious", the Banker's Code is
rather to be described as "altruistic" in this respect. Perhaps
the banker intended to adopt the merchant's slogan, that the
customer is always right. Certainly his statute indicates that
he must henceforth refrain from the commoner forms of mis-
57Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (Beutel's 5th ed. 1932) 831.
See infra note 113.5sA. B. A. Code § 4. The result would seem to be that collecting banks
holding paper through such an indorsement obtain no title to it, although,
of course, as holders they may bring suit upon it in their representative
capacity. See Williams, Beacon & Co. v. Shadbolt, 1 Cab. & El. 529
(1885). And see Farmers' Exchange Bank v. Farm & Home Say. &
Loan Ass'n, supra note 50.
59A. B. A. Code § 4. "An indorsement of an item by the payee or other
depositor 'for deposit' shall be deemed a restrictive indorsement and in-
dicate that the indorsee bank is an agent for collection and not owner
of the item." There was a conflict on this point at common law. In First
National Bank of Sioux City v. John Morrell & Co., 53 S. D. 496, 221
N. W. 95, 60 A. L. R. 863 (1928), such an indorsement was held re-
strictive. Contra, Security Bank v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 58 Minn.
141, 59 N. W. 987 (1894); Ditch v. Western Nat. Bank, 79 Md. 192, 29
At. 72 (1894); see also Note, 60 A. L. R. 866 (1929).
GOBlaine, Gould & Short v. Bourne & Co., 11 R. I. 119 (1875).
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appropriation, at least where his customer can be trained to
indorse his paper "for deposit". In the good old days, the
New York court protected a banker in the position of the
collecting bank by calling him a sub-purchaser,"' not a sub-
agent as provided in the statute. But this was at a time when
both forwarder and collecting bank allowed drawings against
uncollected paper. The court, moreover, did not even require
that the collecting bank show that it had paid out value, its
undertaking alone being enough.62 And likewise, on the re-
mittance theory, the court held that a credit given by the col-
lecting bank to the forwarder, at a time when the latter's
account was overdrawn, would constitute a remittance, in
spite of the fact that the forwarding bank had merely taken
the paper as "agent".6 3 But in this case too there was no
restrictive indorsement; in fact had the depositor "indorsed
the check 'for collection' a different question would ... [have
been] presented."' 6 4 Still, the "bad" bank is not entirely
without friends, for the Pennsylvania court recently condoned
the outright sale by an "agent" bank of its customers' paper,6 5
and rode rough shod over a restrictive indorsement to protect
the collecting bank under the Code.
Why did the banker throw over his early favorable pre-
cedents and tinker with the restrictive indorsement in this
way? One suspects he did not fully understand what he was
doing. But he had a reason, for it seems the collecting banker
wanted to guard against loss in presenting altered paper to
61Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd, 90 N. Y. 530 (1882).
62The forwarding bank being a purchaser, it was of course immaterial,
in the absence of fraud, whether the sub-purchaser had paid out value
or not before learning of the forwarding bank's insolvency. See First
Nat. Bank v. Mt. Pleasant Milling Co., 103 Iowa 518, 72 N. W. 689, 690
(1897).6 3King v. Bowling Green Trust Co., 145 App. Div. 398, 129 N. Y. S.
977 (1911).
64King v. Bowling Green Trust Co., 145 App. Div. 398, 403, 129 N. Y. S.
977, 980 (1911).
65Lipshutz v. Philadelphia Savings Fund Soc., 107 Pa. Super. Ct. 481,
164 Atl. 74 (1933.). Evidently the holder had used a blank indorsement
in depositing the paper and the bank of deposit a restrictive "Pay any
bank or banker" indorsement on forwarding it, receiving the "full con-
sideration" for the item. Next day the forwarding bank failed and the
depositor sought to recover his item, which was refused. A comparison
with the attitude of the courts in denying an agent any authority to col-
lect before maturity, Oren v. Seim, 192 Wis. 551, 212 N. W. 949, (1927),
makes it impossible to see how the forwarding bank's action could be ap-
proved. And as for the collecting bank, not only did it obtain no title
by virtue of the restrictive indorsement, but as agent to collect it must
have known that there was no authority given it to buy. Banks do not
use restrictive indorsements when discounting their own paper.
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to drawee for payment. " By appearing from his customer's
restrictive indorsement to be an agent, the drawee was put on
notice that any overplus paid out to him on raised paper
could not be recovered, where the proceeds had in turn been
paid over-this on familiar principles of agency law.6 7 In
the companion situation, however, involving paper bearing a
prior forged or unauthorized indorsement, the opposite result
was provided for; in such case the collecting banker was made
to warrant his title to the drawee. By so doing, any further
need of using the familiar "prior indorsements guaranteed"
stamp was obviated. 8 But how any line in policy may be
drawn between indorsement and alteration risks, not even a
banker's lawyer can explain intelligently. 9 And, since the
Leonardi case,70 it may be surmised that not many depositor
indorsements have been made over into restrictive indorse-
ments, as the statute permits the banker to do. Perhaps the
banker is even beginning to rue his haste in making the "Pay
any bank or banker" indorsement restrictive; but this may do
him an injustice.
It is the banker's penchant for blowing both hot and cold
at the same time which has gotten him into trouble, plus his
inordinate fear of minor risks. Even this brief survey indi-
cates that his collection statute, so far from achieving uni-
formity, rather has increased the confusion in the field. It
is not even constitutional as applied to national bank liquida-
tions, nor in any respect in at least one state. His effort to
pose as an agent when dealing with his customer, and then to
act as an owner when forwarding paper to his correspond-
ents, is something less than ethical. So much so, indeed, that
it is amusing to see him come a cropper over the restrictive
indorsement, all in a strenuous effort to win a pawn. But
this is only to touch upon a few sore points; there are many
other matters of questionable policy not possible to mention
here.71 Enough has been said, at all events, to indicate that
the present statute is far too pro-banker in spirit ever to be
6Paton, loc. cit. supra note 15.67See National Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28, 20 N. E.
632, 633 (1889).
6SA. B. A. Code § 4.
69There has been some suggestion that the usual prior indorsements
guaranteed stamp covers both alteration and indorsement risks. New
York Produce Exchange Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 134 App. Div. 953,
119 N. Y. Supp. 988 (1909), and see Note, 11 N. C. L. Rev. 318 (1933).
7oSupra note 54.
7'Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation, 8 Tulane L. Rev. 21 (1933).
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widely adopted, much less to become a uniform statute. It
does not even serve the bankers' best interests, to say nothing
of those of the financial community.
It would be fortunate, at this juncture, if the collection
statute being prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws were ready for adoption, but it is not. Nor can it
well be made ready until agreement is reached on some broad
questions of policy. Indeed, Beutel would have it that the
1934 draft of the proposed Uniform Act, being more skilfully
drawn, is not only "vicious" but even "more dangerous so-
cially" 72 than the Bankers Code. It too favors "the bankers
at the expense of the depositors in almost every case," 7 3 -as
he sees it. And, while Beutel apparently does not disapprove
of the plan to compensate the depositor by creating a "trust"
in his favor on the liquid assets in the hands of the failed
collecting bank, without tracing, there are others who do and
very positively. According to Bogert, although admitting
that the tendency both by statute and decision has been de-
cidedly in that direction, such a use of the "trust" concept "is
to be deplored.1 74 Not only is it "vicious in that it makes the
law uncertain and contradictory, 7 5 but it is unsound as a
matter of economics. The holder or the forwarding bank
should assume all risk in the first instance, with the idea that
they may "distribute" losses over as large a part of the com-
mercial community as possible.
One of Bogert's points at least may readily be conceded;
there is no reason why a legislature today should use the
"trust" as a means of protecting forwarders against collection
losses. Even a carefully drawn state provision would now,
in all probability, be held invalid as applied to national
banks.78 And, if Congress must act in the matter, it may pro-
vide directly for the order of preference which it considers
desirable in the case. So may the states as applied to state
banks. In fact there have already been at least two statutes
introduced in Congress designed to pay the forwarder out in
full ahead of the local depositors, much as is done under the
Banker's Code, but without using the word "trust". And,
both failed of passage, though not for reasons of form.
72Beutel, Bank Collection Act, 9 Tulane L. Rev. 378, 385 (1935).
73Ibid.74Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Items and Trust Preferences, 29
Mich. L. Rev. 545, 567 (1931).75Bogert, loc. cit. supra note 74, at p. 559 (referring to "trust" law).
76See supra note 37.
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The fate of these efforts at federal legislation is instruc-
tive. The first, known as the Strong bill,77 was introduced
in 1930 with the active support of various millers and grain
dealers associations. At the hearing before the Committee
on Banking and Currency the millers brought out that they
were losing thousands of dollars each year through loss of
collection proceeds in failed national banks. It was pointed
out that they had no means of passing upon the solvency of
the particular collecting banks which might come to handle
their paper; that no credit was wanted on the books of such
banks as in the case of a deposit; that, in fact, such banks
should be regarded as mere "conduits" having by chance
money belonging to the forwarder in their possession. But
the local depositors were also well represented, for Secretary
Mellon in a letter to the committee made it clear that the
absence of any "tracing" or "augmentation" provision would
"result in penalizing the general creditors," clearly an "un-
just" result 7 8 Moreover, figures were introduced showing
that in 1929 amounts paid out on preferred and secured
claims very nearly equalled those paid to general creditors.7 9'
Evidently the matter would be well enough taken care of if
left with the courts, though they admittedly were in a state
of confusion. The 1935 bill, 0 broadened to cover all items
collected through national banks, fell before the same oppo-
sition.
No one, evidently, is going to volunteer to assume the
burden of collection losses. The local depositor has his
friends in the Treasury; the collecting banks have been too
zealously represented by their association; the large check
holders, manufacturers, millers and insurance companies,
while forced by stipulation to assume many risks, have been
aided by court and legislature to a very great extent. More-
over the large creditors have been able to put the whole loss
back on the drawer by use of a simple stipulation that the
drawer's check will not be regarded as payment of his debt
until the payee is actually put in funds.81 The whole thing is
77H. R. Bill #5634, '1st Congress (1930).
78H. R. Bill #5634, 71st Congress (1930), Hearings, p. 72 (May 16,
1930).
79Ibid. p. 77.
80S. Bill #1078, introduced in the Senate on January 16, 1935, by Mr.
Sheppard.8'Dunham, loc. cit. supra note 36, at p. 612, points out very clearly the
practice to be followed. The policy holder is to be told that: "Remittance
may be made by check or draft subject to the condition that such cheek
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in a delightful muddle. Nor will it clear up matters to resort
to personalities and call the banker or the large creditor
"vicious", merely because he has had the economic power and
"vision" to force his position. Our institutions are built on
freedom of contract as a basic principle, 2 which of course
involves an element of exploitation at times 3 It is but
"natural", perhaps, that the drawer should come out at the
little end of the horn.
But why not face this word "vicious"? If a pro-banker
statute is "vicious", does it follow that a pro-depositor or a
pro-drawer act would be "beneficial"? To say so would make
this whole battle of adjectives a purely emotional outburst,
conditioned by the desire of one group or another for personal
gain. After all by what values should a collection system be
tested? In the writer's view the standard should be the same
as that by which a sound currency system is tested. For it
must not be lost sight of that the check has today largely
displaced the bank note as a medium of exchange. And when
one goes back in our history over the long and very troubled
path by which the bank note finally came to its present state
of security,8 4 backed by the United States government,8 5 it is
evident that the matter is not one which can be left to the
pulling and hauling of different groups impelled by self in-
terest. There is a national interest to be considered.
The first essentials, from this viewpoint, are to provide
maximum safety and efficiency in handling collections and to
have done with the bickering about who should bear what
or draft may be handled for collection in accordance with the practice of
the collecting bank or banks, and that any receipt issued therefore
shall be void unless the amount due is actually received by the company."
The object is clear, that the drawer should take the entire collection
risk, even though he is, perhaps, the least able of anyone in the
transaction to do so.82At least Jessel, M. R., thought so. " . . . if there is one thing which
more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting
• .." Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson L. R. 19
Eq. Cas. 462, 465 (1875). But see 8 Holdsworth, A History of English
Law (1926) 56; Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 Yale L.
Jour. 1089 (1930). According to Bowen, L. J., who put the thing mildly,
"the interests of contracting parties are not necessarily the same as the
interests of the -commonwealth." Maxim Nordenfelt Co. v. Nordenfelt
L. R. [1893] 1 Ch. Div. 630, 661.83See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. of
Chi. L. Rev. 501, 510 (1935).84See Conant, History of Modern Banks of Issue (1896) 286-385; Knox,
A History of Banking in the United States (1900) 399-413.85For an instructive commentary on the politics by which this result




risks. Of course it is not going to be possible in the nature
of things to give assurances that every man's check is at all
times actually worth its face value, except, indeed, as it has
been certified. 6 But the matter of losses in collection, whether
due to some bank's insolvency or its negligence in handling
the paper, should be eliminated as far as possible. These are
of concern to the banking fraternity, but they should be of
none whatever to the depositor. And conversely the current
effort, verbally at least, to lock up and hold apart the millions
of dollars of paper always in process of collection, that is
the "float", is financially speaking extremely short sighted.
To convert the banker actually into a "conduit" neither serves
the banker nor the depositor in the long run.8 7 If this be
"vicious", those who care to "may make the most of it."
At the threshold to any sane solution, as a stumbling block,
has been the riddle of how to surmount the failed bank losses.
These out of the way, the losses due to bank negligence can be
seen in their right perspective. Several years ago the writer
suggested that the matter was a proper one to be covered by
insurance, 8 but no private company to date has been inter-
ested-except, of course, as it has sought to shunt its own
losses on to its policy holders. 9 Possibly the risk has been
regarded as too large for a private company to undertake.
86Nor even then, unless the certified check can be brought clearly with-
in the protection of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See,
Steffen and Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N. C.
L. Rev. 450, 476 (1935). Precisely what constitutes a deposit within the
statute is not clearly pointed out. A mere purchase of a bank draft or
cashier's check would probably not be considered a deposit. See Widman
v. Kellogg, 22 N. D. 396, 133 N. W. 1020, 1022 (1911); Kidder v. Hall,
113 Tex. 49, 251 S. W. 497, 499 (1923). On the other hand, a deposit is
not extinguished by the acceptance therefor of a bank draft or cashier's
check. Gilmore & P. R. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
208 Fed. 277 (C. C. A. 3d 1913); Middlekauff v. State Banking Board,
111 Tex. 561, 242 S. W. 442 (1922); State v. Tyler County State Bank,
277 S. W. 625 (Tex. Com. App. 1925). By analogy, it would seem that
a customer's account is guaranteed without any reduction for checks
drawn upon it until such checks are paid. Certification, if procured by
the drawer, would seemingly not change the result. See Downey v. Cit-
izens State Bank, 194 N. E. 743, 744 (Ind. App. 1935). But if procured
by the payee, it could be held to have extinguished the deposit. See Borne
v. First Nat. Bank, 123 Ind. 78, 24 N. E. 173 (1890). It would be de-
sirable, as an aid to the certified check, to find that a new guaranteed
deposit had been created in such case in favor of the holder.
871t may be pointed out that the finance companies and commercial
factors have built up a substantial business under the very noses of the
bankers by dealings in receivables of a no more liquid character. See
Steffen and Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 Col.
L. Rev. 745, 773 (1936).88See Turner, loc. cit. supra note 4, at p. 906.89See supra note 81.
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More likely it is thought that with 49 varieties of commercial
banks, each variety with a constantly changing legal struc-
ture, there are elements of risk against which no private com-
pany dare insure. But these reasons do not apply to govern-
ment insurance in the same degree. Wherefore, why not
broaden the Federal Deposit Insurance statute0 to include col-
lections ?91 The machinery is already set up. And assuredly
nothing could do more at one stroke to bring order out of
chaos in the collection field than to banish forever the spectre
of bank failure.
But the banker does not like the guaranty of deposits
statute, and with some reason . 2 Moreover, he has been tell-
ing himself, and the world, so long that he functions merely
as a "conduit" in handling out of town checks; that any credit
given the depositor is merely provisional; that any drawings
allowed are but an act of grace on his part; that, in short, he
would probably oppose the suggestion vehemently, 93 even
though it were to his best interest to approve it. At all
events, the banker's chief argument against the guaranty of
deposits-that it charges the strong, carefully managed bank
to protect the depositors in the weak 94-- would have no ap-
plication. For once the shoe would be on the right foot, for
the forwarding bank and its depositors would gain protec-
tion in direct proportion to their part in the insurance cost.
Nor need the cost be exorbitant, if we have at last attained
to something like banking security.95
If the banker can now be induced to sit down and look at
the situation calmly he will see that broadly speaking three
9OAct of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. at L. 168, § 12B, 12 U. S. C. § 264;
as amended by Act of June 28, 1935, c. 335, 49 Stat. at L. 684, 12 U. S.
C. § 264. See for an able and favorable discussion of this legislation,
Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. 809 (1936). For a study of the prior state ex-
perience, see Butts, State Regulation of Banking by Guaranty of De-
posits, 2 Miss. L. Jour. 208 (1929).
910n what is a "deposit" within the act, see generally, Breckenridge,
The Banking Act of 1935, 32 Am. Bar Ass'n. Jour., 93, 95 (1936).92See Willis, The Folly of Deposit Guaranty, 31 Amer. Mercury 16
(1934).
93The banker was outspoken in opposition to the Federal Reserve Act
when it was before Congress. And many will remember the open de-
fiance with which one Charles E. Mitchel, as president of one of the
large New York banks, met the Federal Reserve Board efforts late in
1929 to curtail speculation. But, of course, the lawyer has not always
exactly welcomed suggestions looking toward procedural reform.
94Bradford, The Banking Act of 1935, 25 Am. Econ. Rev. 661 (1935).
95Some 34 licensed banks failed during 1935, with aggregate deposit
liabilities of $10,158,000, which number, while still too large, is yet




types of paper are affected. First is the discounted item such
as the trade acceptance, as to which the bank already bears
the full risk of collection hazards, for neither the Banker's
Code's nor the usual collection waiver has anything to do
with "purchased" paper.9 7  A guaranty of collections would
be of great advantage to the banker here, and incidentally to
the customer. At the other extreme is the time note or other
item, including all restrictively indorsed paper, which is taken
for collection, no credit being given until proceeds are re-
ceived. Here, if anywhere, the bank should function as a
"conduit" and without responsibility except for its own
fault.9 8 And, moreover, since the depositor alone would gain
by the guaranty provision, he should pay the costs, unless the
matter is one de minimis. Which leaves the vast middle
ground occupied by the blank indorsed check deposited for
credit, the item with which this paper is principally con-
cerned. Obviously if the banker is going to use these items
-as he does-to build up his balances with a correspondent,
and if the depositor is going to be allowed on occasion-as
he is-to draw against his credit, both banker and depositor
gain here by elimination of the hazard of a collecting bank's
failure.
It was on this analysis that the Commissioners' Uniform
Act was drafted to make the initial bank a "purchaser", both
of checks and of discounted drafts.9 9 Whether the depositor
might draw immediately in the case of his check, however,
was recognized as being a credit matter to be arranged be-
tween bank and depositor. 0 0 But it was also recognized, as
a practical matter, that it would not be possible to put the
9 6See supra note 48.
97The point is incontestable on the authorities, although, of course,
where the necessary proceedings can be taken on dishonoured paper, the
customer would remain liable upon his indorsement. This is, in fact, the
basis for the charge back practice. Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83
Pac. 1048 (1905); and see Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Pringle, 43
P.(2d) 515 (Idaho 1935).98The 1934 draft of the Uniform Act (§ 33) adopts the Massachusetts
rule as to this type of paper only. All other paper is deemed purchased
(§ 16), with a limited right of charge back (§ 25). See Fifth Tentative
Draft of Uniform Bank Collection Act, Handbook of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1931) 160. Mr.
Beutel erroneously assumes that the section applies to all deposited paper
and condemns the act as archaic. See Beutel, loc. cit. supra note 42,
at p. 404. If one is to be at all realistic about the matter, it must be
recognized that banks should be permitted to handle certain paper
without responsibility. Consider, for example, foreign items in war time.
99U. B. C. A. § 16.
looU. B. C. A. § 21.
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bank in such a position, unless the "trust" device would really
work. As a matter of plain realism no bank could have as-
sumed the collection losses of the last ten years and stayed
solvent-unless indeed, an elaborate system of charging de-
positors were to have been set up to provide an insurance
fund. And it was more than clear that state legislation could
not reach so far as to require this of national banks; state
legislation was stretched to the breaking point in setting up
the "trust". But even apart from its invalidity as applied
to national banks, the "trust" device was but makeshift pro-
tection. For one thing, where there were several preferred
claims, it might not even suffice to pay out in full, and for
another, it made no provision for delays and costs in collec-
tion. There was nothing else to do but to authorize the bank
to charge back any item whose proceeds were not received in
regular course due to the insolvency of a collecting bank.101
That chapter is now fortunately closed; plainly both state
and national legislation is needed. And, if a satisfactory col-
lection guaranty system can be worked out, as seems easily
possible, it is even more apparent than heretofore that the
forwarding bank should hold collection paper as a "pur-
chaser" and not merely as the depositor's "agent". The great
mass of paper even today is collected without difficulty. There
should in the future be no need (or privilege) to charge
back paper for the reason only that some correspondent bank
may have become insolvent; the item having been paid the
depositor 9hould be able to proceed as though no failure had
occurred, as should the drawer also. Nor will this be burden-
some to the bank, for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion would itself pay up the loss promptly to it, and in full.
10 2
It could then proceed with the slower process of realizing
upon the assets of the failed bank. And, should the forward-
101U. B. C. A. § 25.
lO2To insure less than all of a collection item would simply be to
perpetuate if not to increase the present confusion, though restricted
to the uninsured portion. And, while it may appear to be favoring check
holders unduly, as compared with drawers, since deposits at present
are only insured up to $5000, it must not be lost sight of that the latter
are now being forced to assume the entire collection risk anyway, and
would actually benefit correspondingly by the provision. Moreover, there
is a great deal in the argument of those courts which were finding a
constructive trust in the forwarder's favor; there are many reasons why
the forwarder is to be differentiated from the depositor. To mention
only one, the latter contemplates a continuing debtor-creditor relation,
the former does not. The present suggestion would recognize this dif-
ference, but would put the remedy on a much sounder footing than the
courts could possibly put it.
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ing bank fail, it is of course necessary to show a debtor-
creditor relation in order that the depositor may come within
the protection of the guaranty law. This the Commissioner's
Act provided for by its "purchase" provision.- 3 At the same
time, of course, it is always open to any depositor to contract
for his common law protection, since the restrictive indorse-
ment is readily at hand for his use, as witness the Leonardi
case.1
0 4
The element of unreality in the situation is that the for-
warding banker says he will not allow drawings against
uncollected paper. And Beutel asks, what kind of a "pur-
chaser" is this who makes no agreement to pay? Moreover,
is he a "holder", a "holder for value" or a "holder in due
course"?105 Surely these well defined terms should suffice
without introducing the word "purchaser", or for that matter
the word "agent". 10 The Banker's Code meets the situation,
characteristically, by saying that although credit is given for
an item the bank still continues to be an "agent"; but to the
extent that it allows such credit "to be withdrawn", it also
becomes an "owner". 0 7 Nothing could be simpler, providing
the banker is willing to lead a double life. But the point is
that the present non-drawing practice is artificial, induced
by the very real fear on the part of the banker that to allow
any drawing-no matter how small or how justified as a
credit matter-will be construed by many courts to convert
him into something other than an agent and so make him
103U. B. C. A. § 16. The bank becoming a purchaser of the deposited
item upon credit being given to the depositor in his drawing account,
there should be no question but that the transaction represents a de-
posit within the federal act. This was one reason why the depositor
was denied a preferred claim upon the insolvency of the forwarding
bank. In Beutel's view, however, "Here is another piece of gross in-
justice" to the depositor. Beutel, loc. cit. supra note 42, at p. 397.
'04Supra, note 54.05Beutel, ioc. cit. supra note 42, at p. 394.
10 6Beutel, loc. cit. supra note 42, at p. 395. The objection is made here
that to denominate a bank handling collection paper an "agent" is a
mistake, "because the customer exercises no control over the bank." And,"surely the customer is not liable for the bank's torts in collecting his
paper . . . " Of course the customer does give instructions concerning
collection paper which the bank must follow. And equally clearly there
is nothing inconsistent with the authorities in treating the bank both as"agent" and "independent contractor." See Steffen, Cases on Agency
(1933) 228 et seq., where the problem is considered.
0o7A. B. A. Code § 2. It has never been satisfactorily explained,
though, how a forwarding bank-by allowing credit withdrawals-be-
comes an "owner" of paper which it may have already forwarded on to
a collecting bank, especially since the latter becomes a sub-agent of the
customer and may itself acquire a lien or purchase position.
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liable for collection losses. 10 8 By rembving this fear (and
forbidding charge back of collected paper) his obligation to
honor drawings, deferred though it may be, becomes real
enough.
The use of "holder" to describe the forwarding banker's
interest in deposited paper would obviously be quite mean-
ingless for present purposes. He might be a "purchaser"
even though not a holder, ° 9 and as holder his interest might
range all the way from that of an "agent", a "bailee", a
"trustee", a "donee" on to that of a "converter". But the
further suggestion that the banker should be treated as a
"holder for value" upon credit being given for a deposited
item, raises a more important question. Mr. Beutel's thought
that the bank in such case should be a "holder in due
course", 11 0 if it acted in good faith, shows a curious confusion
of ideas. Of course giving credit alone, where that means
the depositor may draw at once, constitutes "value" as de-
fined in all the uniform acts. Moreover, and this Mr. Beutel
has failed to see, it may be taken as an indication that the
bank is a "purchaser" of the paper,"' rather than an "agent"
or whatnot. But it is one thing to say that a bank by giving
credit has become a purchaser and quite another to say that
it has therefore paid out value in such fashion as to have be-
come a holder in due course; to reach such a result is to read
§ 54 of the N.I.L. entirely out of the act.
1 2
' 08See supra note 48.
109N. I. L. § 49.
1"0 The point is made more fully in Brannan's, Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (Beutel's 5th ed. 1932) 330 et seq., § 25.
"For example, in Blacher v. National Bank of Baltimore, 151 Md.
514, 135 Atl. 383 (1926), the forwarding bank had given credit (not
subject to drawing) for three blank indorsed checks and in turn had
forwarded them to the defendant collecting bank for credit subject to
immediate drawing. The items were duly paid. Upon the failure of
the forwarding bank, shortly afterward, the customer sought to recover
the proceeds in the hands of the collecting bank, but without success.
Obviously this did not raise a question as to whether the defendant was
a holder in due course, but merely as to whether it was a sub-purchaser.
To translate in terms of the horse, suppose that A sells a horse to B on
credit and B in turn sells to C on credit. If thereafter B should fail
without paying A there is no doubt but that A has no right whatever
against C, even though C should not have paid a cent to B. This was
all that the Blacher case decided, as is true also of First Nat. Bank v.
Cross & Napper, 157 So. 636 (La. App. 1934), which Beutel cites as
further authority. These cases are no authority for the proposition that
the collecting bank would be a holder in due course free of equities or
entitled to cut off defenses of prior parties, merely because it had given
credit.
ll2Which Mr. Beutel attempts to do, for in his opinion "this section
does not apply to credits because the credit itself is the full amount to be
given." Brannan, op. cit. supra note 110, at p. 331, § 25. This sounds
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No such truly "vicious", not to say pro-banker, suggestion
has been made in years. Fortunately it is not law. 13  But, as
a matter of policy, why should Beutel even be anxious to aid
a banker who has merely given credit for an item, as against
a maker who has been defrauded by the bank's depositor?
Surely it is not too much to ask the banker in such case to
charge the item back to the wrong-doer and forego collection
from the victim. Or, where the banker holds stolen paper
under such circumstances, to require that it be delivered up
to the true owner. In fact Bogert goes to the other extreme
and insists on the constructive trust rule, that the paper or its
proceeds should be recoverable so long as the depositor's bal-
ance has not been reduced below the amount of the item in
question. 14 And even the Banker's Code asked only that the
banker be given an "owner" position, whatever that is, to
the extent that he should have allowed drawings against a
credit."15 This last is substantially the position of the Uniform
Act, with the significant addition that an effort is made to
state how drawing should be allocated, in order to determine
when a credit may be said to have been withdrawn. The
point is one of considerable confusion in the decisions." 6 To
go farther and provide that giving credit alone is enough
would be "outrageous" in this day.
It remains to consider the negligence risks. The courts,
working from case to case, built up a fairly strict body of law
to govern the forwarding banker. He must act with dili-
gence, he must use care to select a competent correspondent
very much like pro-banker sophistry. N. I. L. § 59 reads as follows:
"Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same before
he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid therefor, he will be deemed
a holder in due course only to the extent of the amount theretofore paid
by him." A credit is at most a promise to pay for an instrument, not a
payment.
" 3 All of the cases cited under the act-as before-require that the
bank have allowed drawings before it may be regarded as a holder in due
course. The courts phrase their decisions loosely by saying that credit
alone is not value. See Brannan, op. cit. supra note 110, at p. 331 et
seq., § 25.
'14See Fifth Tentative Draft of Uniform Bank Collection Act, loc.
cit. supra note 98, at pp. 179, 180, where the reasons for not following
Mr. Bogert's suggestion are stated. For a case discussing the point, see
First Nat. Bank of Appleton v. Court, 183 Wis. 203, 197 N. W. 798, 799
(1924).
"5 See supra, note 107.
116U. B. C. A. § 22. The section as drafted follows the majority de-
cisions in applying the so-called "first-in, first-out," rule. See Fifth
Tentative Draft of Uniform Bank Collection Act, too. cit. supra note 98,
at p. 179, for discussion and citations.
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and he must not route his customers paper in an unduly cir-
cuitous manner. The first two rulings are still good law, but
the third quickly gave way before banker statutes saying that
it should be due care to route paper in any manner according
to banking usage.117  Again it was ruled, in spite of some
early doubts on the point,"18 that it was negligence to forward
paper directly to the drawee and further that to receive any-
thing but money in payment should be at the banker's own
peril. Both of these rulings, as mentioned above, 1 9 are now
generally avoided, if not by statute, then by contract stipu-
lation. Moreover, the New York collection rule making the
forwarding bank responsible for the negligence of its corres-
pondents is now a thing of the past, for all practical purposes.
All told, these are no doubt but minor risks as compared with
those growing out of bank failure, but still, what is to be
done with them? A loss of even one dollar in the collection
department causes the banker, as a good shepherd, more con-
cern than ninety and nine in any other.
There are three ways to go about the matter. The first
is to let things stand as they are, with all that that signifies
in terms of charge-back, delay and expense. It at least per-
mits the non-negligent banker to avoid loss. The second
would be to force the adoption of the New York collection
rules. In the writer's view this has always seemed the
sounder policy, granted it were feasible, if for no other reason
than because it enlists the active support of the forwarding
bank in adjusting a loss.1 2 0 Not exactly that one should ap-
pear to be setting a banker to catch a banker, but simply that
a small depositor is at a hopeless disadvantage if he must
press a claim against a distant bank. It would usually be
cheaper to abandon it entirely. For this reason as much as
for any other, the initial carrier was long ago made liable to
the shipper for the negligence of connecting roads.' 2' The
"1TTurner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice, 39 Yale
L. Jour. 468, 469 (1930). For a case showing to what lengths this leg-
islation permits the forwarding bank to go without responsibility, see
Montsdoca v. Highlands Bank & Trust Co., 85 Fla. 158, 95 So. 666 (1923).
""See favorable comments on the practice by the court in Thomas v.
Supervisors of Westchester County, 115 N. Y. 47, 51, 21 N. E. 674
(1889).
1 9Supra note 14.
120 Turner, loc. cit. supra note 4, at p. 906.
121This was provided by the so-called Carmack Amendment, Act of
June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 593, 49 U. S. C. § 20(11). For
a case discussing the shipper's plight before the amendment, which com-
pares with that of the check holder, see Atlantic Coast Line v. River-
side Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 55 L. Ed. 167 (1911). Under
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third would be to insure the risk in the same manner as it is
suggested the insolvency risk should be covered, letting the
Insurance Corporation adjust the negligence claim directly
with the bank at fault.
It may simplify matters to differentiate betwen negligence
losses occurring before and those occurring after payment of
an item. From the forwarding banks viewpoint it is impos-
sible to know, when an item has been returned unpaid, wheth-
er the reason was that the postal authorities had delayed un-
duly, that the collecting bank presented to the wrong person,
or, more likely, that the drawer or maker in fact had no
funds on deposit. The last clearly, and probably the first, are
chargeable to the depositor, as conditions under which he does
business. But the true reason for the dishonor may not be
ascertained for weeks and in the interim there should be no
question but that the forwarding bank should be permitted
to charge the item back as unpaid.122 For the same reason it
would be very difficult to frame a guaranty provision which
would work. But once the item has been paid, and the drawer
and indorsers discharged, the transaction takes on a very dif-
ferent appearance. From the depositor's angle it should be
immaterial why the proceeds do not return, whether because
of some remitting bank's negligence or because of its insol-
vency. It is purely an inter-bank matter. Here clearly the
guaranty machinery should be called into play.
But of course Rome was not built in a day, and by the same
token it would probably not be possible to give all items even
so much protection as is here suggested at the start. In the
first place it would be essential that the Insurance Corpora-
tion be given charge of the liquidation of any collecting bank
failing with proceeds in hand.23 Foreign items would clearly
be ineligible. Moreover, it would probably be desirable also
to give the Corporation some power in an administrative ca-
pacity to control the conditions under which collections are
handled. Accordingly it would only be such items 'as are
drawn on or are to be handled by banks to join the guaranty
system which could be covered. But even so, the advantages
the common law, a carrier could make such contract with the shipper as
it saw fit. As a result, the initial carrier usually limited its liability to
losses occurring on its own line.
' 22See the amazing case of Jacobs v. Mohnton Trust Co., 299 Pa. 527,
149 At. 887, 888 (1930), where indorsers were released through no
fault of either the forwarding bank, the postal service or the collecting
bank.
12 The present federal act is set up on that basis.
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to customers would be so obvious, it would seem, that no
bank could well remain out of the system.124 It might well be
possible, moreover, to develop a service whereby the Corpora-
tion could handle the customer's ordinary negligence claims
on unpaid items or on items not included within the protec-
tion of the guaranty. While no banker particularly likes to
have such an organization at hand to look down his collar,
it would nevertheless serve to eliminate much of the cus-
tomer's loss and uncertainty now prevailing, and without re-
quiring recourse to litigation.
To draw so sharp a line between paid and unpaid items
gives great prominence to what constitutes payment. It is
all very well to speak of insuring the proceeds of a paid item
and of preserving the usual contract rights on unpaid paper-
including the drawer's claim to deposit insurance under the
present law125 -but the courts have never charted the field
very thoroughly in the bank cases.12 6 The uncertainty is par-
ticularly glaring where paper has been sent by mail to the
drawee. The latter may hold items without doing anything
for a day or so, or charge the drawer's account without mak-
ing remittance by draft, or both charge and remit by draft but
fail before its draft can be collected. 127  Even the clearing
house payment, involving millions of dollars daily, is uncer-
l24The experience with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is
interesting. On December 31, 1935, insured commercial banks numbered
14,123, of which 5,386 were national banks and members of the Federal
Reserve System, 1,001 were state bank members, and 7,736 were banks
not members of the Federal Reserve System. While member banks con-
stitute a minority of insured banks (6,387 as compared to 7,736), they
account for almost nine-tenths of the resources of all insured commercial
banks. The total number of banks reported upon was 15,836, of which
570 were mutual savings banks and 138 private banks. See 22 Fed.
Res. Bul. 316, 395, 398, 399 (May, 1936).
12 5A further reason for differentiating paid from unpaid items lies
here. If the drawer's item is unpaid and he is not discharged, it follows
that he has all the rights of any depositor under the Deposit Insurance
statute as to his deposit, if any.
126The Negotiable Instruments Law was drawn to fit the simple pat-
tern of a personal presentment (§ 74) and a payment in cash (§ 88).
There is obviously great need, not to amend, but to amplify the act, to
cover the banking cases having to do with mail presentment and pay-
ment by book debit or by draft. Mr. Beutel objects to such provisions
being adopted in a Collection Act. Beutel, loc. cit. supra note 42, at p.
384. But the Commissioners have been fully aware of the situation, and
every effort, as Mr. Beutel knows, has been made to conform the Col-
lection Act provisions to similar ones being prepared as amendments or
additions to the present N. I. L. There is good precedent, as witness the
bills of lading legislation, for a single provision to appear in several acts.
127The problem is discussed in detail in Turner, too. cit. supra note
117, at p. 482 et seq.
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tain on the decisions.128 Is payment final when the drawer's
account is charged or only when the time fixed for returning
unpaid items under clearing house rules has expired,-or
even then? Of course here again the banker has wanted to
keep things in his own hands, so that he may blow either
hot or cold as seems best in the circumstances. 129 But from
the customer's viewpoint this alone is reason enough to re-
quire that the law be clarified.
There is one truly "vicious" situation left to consider. It
gives rise to the question: What is to become of the collect-
ing banker's lien on unpaid colledion items? For many gen-
erations he has been accustomed to lay hold of customers' pa-
per coming to his possession, as security for advances made
to the forwarding bank. 30 And, under the protection care-
fully worked out for bona fide, or innocent, or good faith
purchasers of negotiable instruments, he not only may re-
tain the paper, but may actually recover of the customer on
his indorsement. The result is, that where an intermediate
bank fails and the customer's bank charges the item back
unpaid, the customer has his fingers badly burned. It is a
complete loss. Almost the thing smacks of the jungle, when
set off against a paternalistic effort to safeguard the for-
warder of collection paper. Yet surely the collecting banker
is as much entitled to plead his good faith as any other taker
of negotiable paper. The answer probably lies in the cus-
tomer's use of the restrictive indorsement, though it may be
true that not one customer in ten has ever heard of such an
indorsement. Still, why should not the forwarding banker
likewise be charged with using a restrictive indorsement, un-
less, indeed, he obtains sufficient accommodation from the
collecting bank to be willing to take the risk?18 . Possibly
128U. B. C. A. § 9, has a provision designed to clarify this point. See
discussion, Fifth Tentative Draft of Uniform Bank Collection Code,
loc. cit. supra note 98, at p. 167.
129See, for example, Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank,
240 Fed. 303 (C. C. A. 4th 1917), where the defendant drawee to
which paper had been forwarded for collection delayed until after the
drawer's account had been exhausted (a note of the drawer held by the
bank having been charged to the account) and then returned the paper
unpaid. Obviously it was liable for a breach of good faith, though
ordinarily it is difficult for the forwarder to obtain the facts in such
cases.
130A typical leading case is Bank of the Metropolis v. New England
Bank, 1 How. 234, 11 L. Ed. 115 (1843).
231U. B. C. A. § 36 makes the further point that the forwarding bank
should be charged with responsibility to convert bearer indorsements into
special indorsements where that is possible.
19361 565
TULANE LAW REVIEW
the framers of the Banker's Code builded better than they
knew when they made the "Pay any Bank or Banker" in-
dorsement restrictive.
Without going into further detail, enough has been said
at least to disclose the general scheme of the proposed legisla-
tion. The essential point, on which all else depends, is the
elimination of loss through bank failure. Were we willing
to reduce the number of our banks to a dozen or so, each
with a nation wide branch system, as in England and Canada,
that in itself would be one way to solve the thing.'3 2 It would
also eliminate much of the bickering as to which bank should
assume what risks, if any. But a collection system built on
such a structure should not be so strong, nor essentially so
well conceived, as one brought within the protection of a guar-
anty statute; for if a failure should occur the ensuing credit
rupture would be all the greater. Of course there is perhaps
not sufficient actuarial data today on which to proceed with
complete assurance, 13 3 but neither was there when the pri-
vate companies began writing fire and life insurance. At
times, if not always, it is necessary to build experimentally.
The process of writing such a scheme into law is surpris-
ingly complicated. In spite of all the political propaganda to
the contrary today it is probable that our forefathers-had
the matter come to their attention-would have lodged com-
plete control of banking, including check collection, with the
central government. 3 4 That there should be a unified system
as an economic matter no one denies, anymore than that the
law pertaining to negotiable paper should be uniform. But
under our present scheme, Congress must set up the insur-
ance part of the plan, which would be effective at once as
respects the national banks, and then hope that the state
banks will voluntarily subscribe. As for the negligence risks,
the states must assume the initiative, since Congressional
"'2Bank failures have been far greater in this country than in countries
having branch banking, whether or not there is any relation of cause
and effect. Spahr, Bank Failures in the United States, 22 Am. Econ.
Rev. Supp. 208, 215 (1932). But, whether this country should encourage
a greater amount of branch banking is, of course, a separate question.
See Gayer, Gold, Banks and the New Deal, 49 Pol. Sci. Quar. 481, 498
(1934).
"3But see Taggert and Jennings, The Insurance of Bank Deposits, 42
Jour. of Pol. Econ. 508 (1934).
134 Not, of course, for purposes of obstructing banking developments in
the interest of justice to the depositor, but with the idea of freeing it
from state legislation having that purpose. Probably the tables are
turned now. See the brilliant study by Rodell, Fifty-Five Men (1936).
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action, binding alone on national banks, might unduly penalize
them, before the state legislatures had acted. In fact it has
been this playing off of state against national legislation, by
the banker, which has done as much as any other thing to
block the development of a strong banking system in the
country.
The far sighted banker, however, should approve the intent
and purpose of the present proposal. With his own some-
what one sided effort at legislation blocked by the courts, or
badly crippled, he should now be willing to co-operate in a
broader effort. Some means must be found to eliminate the
waste and risk incident to the present collection process. And,
granting that the check has now become our principal medium
of exchange, there can be no more doubt of the appropriate-
ness of governmental backing than there is in the case of
the bank note. That is, this all is true, if we actually want
a wholly sound currency system.
